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THE CRIME/TORT DISTINCTION: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND 
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Kenneth W. Simons* 
This essay provides an overview of the crime/tort distinction. 
It first investigates some of the fundamental differences between 
criminal law and tort law in doctrine and legal structure. It then 
explores some important similarities and differences in normative 
perspectives between the two doctrinal fields. This typology 
should prove analytically useful for examining some of the specific 
issues at the borderline of crime and torts—such as the proper 
scope of punitive damage liability and the question whether 
criminal law as well as tort law should vary legal sanctions simply 
because of the fortuitous occurrence of harm. 
A. DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE 
“In the beginning,” of course, crime and tort were not sharply 
distinguished. At early common law, a victim could pursue justice 
for the same wrongful act either through a forerunner of criminal 
law or through a forerunner of tort law.1 But over time, criminal 
law and tort law have evolved to encompass a number of 
distinctive and contrasting features. The following nine features 
are especially salient. 
(1) The state prosecutes violations of criminal law. A victim's 
consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for a prosecution to be 
brought. In tort law, by contrast, the victim decides whether to 
bring a tort claim and is free to choose not to do so.2 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research, The Honorable Frank R. 
Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law. 
1 David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early 
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 59 (1996). 
2 Indeed, one recent theory of tort law, the civil recourse theory, 
championed by John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, claims that the 
optional quality of a tort lawsuit is one of its most important, defining 
characteristics. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the 
Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (2005); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003). I am not so sure 
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This structural difference is sometimes given a more 
substantive gloss: criminal law prohibits "public" wrongs and tort 
law "private" wrongs.3 But what exactly does that mean? Part of 
what it means is this second point of distinction: 
(2) Tort law typically requires harm as a prerequisite to a 
remedy. Criminal law does not. Specifically, criminal law punishes 
not only: 
(a) Acts that are harmful to others, but also: 
(b) Acts that are harmful only or mainly to the actor being 
punished; 
(c) Dangerous acts that have not yet caused harm; and 
(d) Acts that the community considers immoral, even if the 
acts are not "harmful" in the narrower sense of the term. 
By contrast, tort law mainly provides a remedy for harmful 
acts, not for acts that create risks of future harm, and not for acts 
that are considered immoral but not harmful.4 
(3) Criminal law often imposes much more severe sanctions 
than tort law, of course: loss of liberty or even of life. So the 
procedural protections in criminal law obviously are much more 
extensive and (in theory at least) a much greater barrier to liability. 
For example, the criminal defendant, unlike the tort defendant, 
must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the exclusionary 
rule sometimes applies, and the double-jeopardy rule precludes the 
same jurisdiction from pursuing multiple convictions for the same 
conduct.5 
(4) Criminal law, in theory at least, contains a proportionality 
principle, requiring that the punishment "fit" the crime. 
                                                                                                             
about this. We might say the same about all civil remedies, whether they are 
based in tort or property law, contract, unjust enrichment, or statute. 
3 Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 931, 934-35 (1984). 
4 To be sure, there are exceptions. Modern tort law can be viewed as 
allowing compensation merely for risk of harm in limited contexts, such as 
liability for loss of chance (for delayed medical diagnosis) or market-share 
liability. And injunctive relief to prevent future harm or future rights-violations 
is sometimes permitted, such as in nuisance and invasion of privacy cases. 
5 For a thoughtful account of how the civil-criminal distinction should, and 
should not, affect constitutional analysis, see generally William J. Stuntz, 
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
1, 19-24 (1996). 
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Punishment should be proportional to the culpability of the actor 
and the seriousness of the harm or wrong he has committed or 
threatened. 
But tort law does not purport to provide remedies proportional 
to the injurer's wrong: normally, compensation is the remedy, 
whatever the nature of the tort or wrong.6 To be sure, the 
compensatory remedy is scaled to the severity of the harm caused, 
and, in that sense, is proportional.7 But the tort remedy usually 
does not vary with the culpability of the injurer. Suppose, in three 
separate incidents, injurers A, B, and C cause precisely the same 
harm to their respective automobile accident victims; but A is 
strictly liable for a manufacturing flaw in the automobile, a flaw 
that could not have been prevented by due care; while B is 
negligent for momentarily taking his eyes off the road; and C is 
negligent for dangerously passing another car on a busy highway. 
A, B, and C will pay precisely the same damages. 
Of course, punitive damages, in the small number of cases 
where they are awarded, are an important exception: they do 
achieve some degree of proportionality between the level of the 
injurer's culpability and the damages he must pay. But even 
punitive damages are not nearly as sensitive to differences in 
degrees of culpability as criminal law sanctions are. Although the 
degree of reprehensibility of the injurer's conduct is sometimes 
reflected in the size of a punitive damage award, many other 
factors also affect the size of that award, including whether the 
injurer's course of conduct caused widespread harm to persons 
other than the plaintiff.8 
                                                                                                             
6 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral 
Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1142-43 (2007). 
7 Even this type of proportionality is undermined: by the difficulty or 
impossibility of providing genuine compensation for certain types of harms, 
such as pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life, and by the problem that 
wrongful death and survival statutes do not compensate for the lost enjoyment of 
life when the tort victim suffers an early death. Moreover, for certain types of 
intentional wrongs, such as civil rights violations, and perhaps invasions of 
privacy and other emotional harms, tort remedies might more aptly be 
characterized as reflecting respect for the victim or some type of redress for the 
rights-violation than as compensatory. 
8 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court do suggest, however, that states 
may not constitutionally give independent weight to harm to persons other than 
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Related to this point about proportionality is the following 
distinction: 
(5) Criminal law contains a much broader spectrum of fault or 
culpability than does tort law. The spectrum is wider along two 
dimensions: the state of mind, or mens rea, element and the 
conduct, or social harm, element. Thus, the requisite culpable state 
of mind in criminal law ranges from strict liability to negligence to 
recklessness to knowledge to purpose, with punishment varying 
according to that mens rea. (The multiple degrees and categories of 
homicide are the best example of this range.) And the conduct or 
social harm element also ranges enormously. Every American 
jurisdiction contains an extraordinary number and range of 
criminal offenses.9 
By contrast, most of tort law is governed by a negligence 
standard. There are relatively few categories of intentional torts 
and even fewer categories of recklessness and strict liability. To be 
sure, a number of distinct torts address distinct forms of conduct 
and social harm other than the physical harm that negligence law 
protects. For example, the protection of emotional harms ranges 
from emotional distress negligently created by an actor whose 
                                                                                                             
the plaintiff in their punitive damage awards, although they may give weight to 
such harm in determining reprehensibility. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 
S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007). This approach, and the Court's suggestion that 
reprehensibility depends on the harms risked, but not necessarily the harms 
caused, suggests that the Court increasingly views reprehensibility as similar to 
a criminal law conception of culpability. See id. at 1063-64; see also State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In State Farm, the Court 
asserts that reprehensibility is "the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award" and that, in analyzing this factor, 
courts must consider: 
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious 
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or 
safety of others; . . . the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, 
or mere accident. 
Id. at 419 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-77 (1996)). 
These factors would all be highly relevant in determining the degree of 
culpability of an actor facing criminal punishment. 
9 See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 9-10 (2008) (noting that at the federal level alone, 
commentators have estimated that we have 3,300 separate crimes and many 
more regulations that are enforceable through criminal sanctions). 
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conduct threatened physical harm, to invasions of privacy, to 
defamation. Nevertheless, the number of discrete tort causes of 
action pales in comparison to the number of distinct crimes. 
(6) Criminal law requires a greater minimal level of fault 
before liability will be imposed than does tort law. This is a very 
crude generalization, with many exceptions. Still, the minimum 
fault requirement tends, in criminal law, to be something like gross 
negligence or even recklessness, while in tort law, ordinary 
negligence usually suffices. 
Criminal law does contain some doctrines of strict liability, 
especially with respect to the grade of the offense (e.g., reasonable 
mistake is no defense if it only goes to the amount of illegal drugs 
that the actor possesses or to the value of the goods that he has 
stolen) and also with respect to mistake or ignorance of law, where 
even reasonable mistake or reasonable ignorance is normally no 
defense. 
But strict liability is less widespread in criminal law than in 
tort law. Tort recognizes such strict liability doctrines as liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities, for manufacturing defects in 
products, and for wild animals.10 Tort law also pervasively 
imposes strict liability in the form of vicarious liability, especially 
the liability of employers for the tortious acts of their employees.11 
More fundamentally, criminal law targets conduct that is 
impermissible. Or, as economists might say, the optimal incidence 
of criminal conduct is zero.12 But tort law sometimes creates 
liability for perfectly permissible conduct, conduct that we would 
not want to preclude. As Robert Cooter put it, criminal law 
exclusively imposes sanctions, while tort law sometimes prices an 
activity.13 
                                                                                                             
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM 
§§ 20, 22 (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 
(1998). 
11 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413-15 (1965). 
12 See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 20. 
13 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 
(1984). Similarly, in terms of the Calabresi/Melamed framework, criminal law 
creates a property rule (the victim has an entitlement that he cannot be forced to 
sell), while tort law sometimes creates a liability rule (in strict liability torts, the 
law essentially gives the injurer an entitlement to cause harm if he pays for it, 
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(7) Criminal law pays much less attention to the victim's 
conduct than does tort law. First, in criminal law, victim fault 
hardly ever matters. Contributory negligence is not a criminal law 
defense, but it is routinely taken into account in tort law.14  
Second, the consent of the victim to the behavior of the 
wrongdoer, or to the risks imposed by his behavior, is much more 
likely to be a full defense in tort law than in criminal law. 
Criminal law includes many so-called victimless crimes, that 
is, crimes in which both of the immediate parties to the transaction 
consent, such as prostitution, gambling, and drug distribution. And 
consent is generally no defense to causing serious bodily injury, as 
opposed to minor bodily injury, in criminal law; but in tort law, it 
will more often serve as a full defense.15 
(8) Criminal law is statutory. The doctrine of common-law 
crimes is largely defunct. By contrast, tort law remains mainly a 
set of common-law, judge-made doctrines (although the statutory 
overlay is increasing). 
This fundamental difference is related to many others. For 
example, criminal law tends to produce more detailed 
specifications of wrongful behavior than tort law, which, in 
important domains (especially negligence), creates liability 
standards that are maddeningly vague. At the same time, criminal 
                                                                                                             
and gives the victim an entitlement to compensation). Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
14 However, the victim's faulty conduct arguably does matter in a few 
places in the criminal law, especially in the doctrines of provocation (or heat of 
passion) and self-defense. For discussion, see generally Vera Bergelson, Victims 
and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 405-18 (2005) (arguing that perpetrators should be 
entitled to a defense of complete or partial justification when victims reduce 
their right not to be harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver or assumption 
of risk, or involuntarily, by an attack on some legally recognized right of the 
perpetrator). For a reply, see Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Victim 
Conduct in Tort and Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 541 (2005). 
15 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 16 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that 
"consent of the adult injured party is a defense to intentionally inflicted torts," 
but might not be a defense in the analogous situation in criminal law); PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 6-7 (1997). Of course, criminal law does include a 
number of crimes for which consent vitiates the harm and thus precludes 
conviction. Examples include rape and theft. 
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law is in some ways more difficult to change in response to 
changing conditions. Tort law provides a more flexible framework 
for challenging new forms of wrongdoing, such as clergy 
malpractice or invasions of privacy through new technology. 
(9) Excuses to liability are recognized in criminal law much 
more readily than in tort law. Thus, the insane are generally liable 
for their torts, but are not criminally responsible (though again, this 
theoretical difference is belied by actual legal practice, since it is 
extraordinarily difficult for mentally disordered criminal 
defendants to succeed with an insanity defense). Moreover, 
criminal law and tort law differ in their treatment of children: even 
relatively young children are often liable for torts, but they are not 
criminally responsible. 
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Let us turn to the second set of issues: the similarities and 
differences in the normative perspectives underlying criminal law 
and tort law. First, we must distinguish between the functions that 
an area of law performs and the underlying reasons or principles 
that explain and justify those functions. 
 
I. Tort law 
 
A. Main functions of tort law: 
 
1. Plaintiff obtains damages. 
a. As compensation (or redress) 
b. In excess of compensation (some-
times) 
 
2. Defendant pays damages. 
a. As compensation (or redress) 
b. In excess of compensation (some-
times) 
 
3. Deterrence of future torts (by the threat of 
future tort liability). 
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4. Loss-spreading.16 
 
5. Reinforcement of social norms.17  
 
I characterize these five items as functions of tort law in the sense 
that they describe what the award of a tort remedy does. These 
functions are either constitutive of tort remedies or direct effects of 
providing those remedies. 
But it is a separate question whether any of these functions are 
justifiable, or if they are, why they are. Thus, “compensation” is 
often described as one of the purposes of tort liability. But by 
itself, this is not much of an argument. Compensation is not itself a 
good reason for any particular tort law doctrine. All injured people 
could benefit from compensation, whatever the source of their 
injury. So we really need to ask, what is it about defendant's 
behavior that justifies a duty on his part to compensate the 
plaintiff?18 And similarly, it is more accurate to speak of 
“extracompensatory” rather than “punitive” damages insofar as 
this category of damages might be justified for reasons other than 
punishing the defendant.19 
                                                                                                             
16 I describe loss-spreading as a function, not an underlying normative 
principle, because loss-spreading can itself serve a number of different tort goals 
or embody a number of different tort principles, such as optimal deterrence of 
accidents, optimal insurance of accident victims, or distributive justice. See 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 613-16 
(1985). 
17 Arguably, the failure to impose liability also reinforces (different) social 
norms. 
18 Indeed, even the function of “compensation” is sometimes a misleading 
description of actual tort practice. That is why I describe the relevant function as 
compensation or redress. Some so-called compensatory damages do not actually 
compensate a victim in the basic sense of providing the victim with something 
that is equivalent to what the victim lost, or that makes the victim indifferent 
between (a) not being victimized by the tort and (b) being victimized but 
receiving the damage award. Compensation in this sense is most clearly 
inadequate or infeasible when the actual victim has died or has suffered a 
serious personal injury. See supra note 7; Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation 
and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57-61 (1993). 
19 For example, “punitive” damages might be awarded in order to require 
the injurer to pay societal damages for harms to people other than the victim. 
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE 
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The widespread assertion that compensation is itself one of the 
justifiable “goals” of tort law is therefore unhelpful and 
misleading. Compare the analogous argument in criminal law. We 
could say that the purpose of criminal law is to put convicted 
criminals behind bars, or that the purpose is to label those 
convicted of a crime as criminals. But it is perfectly obvious that 
these assertions beg the question: Why (and when) is physical 
incapacitation a legitimate function of punishment? Why (and 
when) is stigmatizing a convicted criminal justifiable? We need to 
address these more fundamental questions if we want to give a 
normative defense of our legal practices. 
 
B. Normative Principles Underlying Tort Law 
 
Broadly, we can distinguish consequentialist and non-
consequentialist justifications both of moral norms and of legal 
doctrines. In my view, to give a plausible and attractive 
explanation of either tort or criminal law, we need to look beyond 
consequentialist arguments, including the utilitarian law and 
economic approach that is an especially popular academic 
approach to tort law. Nonconsequentialist principles must be at 
least part of the best explanation and justification.20 (The following 
list includes the principles most often offered by way of 
justification, but it is hardly exhaustive.) 
 
1. Corrective justice or vindication of rights 
 
This principle adopts an ex post perspective. 
                                                                                                             
L.J. 347, 349-52 (2003). Or they might be awarded in order to provide optimal 
deterrence in cases where the probability of detection of the tort is unusually 
low, as many economically oriented scholars have advocated. See A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 890-91 (1998). 
20 For discussion, see generally Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in 
the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as 
Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001) (providing a detailed evaluation 
of the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts and identifying its limitations in 
addressing efficiency and fairness). See Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, 
Negligence, Tort and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 296 (1996) (explaining that 
the negligence doctrine can be based on a nonconsequential justification). 
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2. Distributive justice 
 
An illustration is vicarious liability, which is often justified by 
the idea that loss-spreading here serves the legitimate goal of 
requiring the many individuals who benefit from the activity to 
share its predictable accident costs. (Shifting the cost of accidents 
from negligent employees to their employers results in spreading 
that cost to consumers of the relevant product or service.) 
Some strict liability rules can also be justified this way: they 
require compensation from the party who obtains a nonreciprocal 
benefit (as when a boat owner justifiably trespasses but uses the 
dock owner's property for his own benefit21) or who inflicts a 
nonreciprocal risk (as is typically the case when the actor engages 
in an abnormally dangerous activity or owns a wild animal).22 
 
3. Deterrence, in order to promote efficiency 
 
This law and economics approach exemplifies utilitarian 
principles. 
 
4. Deterrence, in order to prevent wrongs or 
rights-violations 
 
This is a mixed theory, which focuses on whether tort liability 
will produce good consequences, but not just on consequences for 
social welfare in the utilitarian sense.23 
 
                                                                                                             
21 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 1910). 
22 Moreover, what counts as a permissible risk for purposes of negligence 
law can depend in part on distributive justice principles, such as whether the 
class of persons exposed to the risk obtains sufficient benefit from the risk, or 
instead are the unilateral victims of the risky activity. See Kenneth W. Simons, 
Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the 
Controversy, LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); see generally RICHARD W. 
WRIGHT, THE STANDARDS OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE LAW, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed. 1995). 
23 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1824-28 (1997). 
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II.   Criminal law 
 
 When we turn to criminal law, again it is important to 
distinguish the functions of a criminal sanction from the normative 
principles that plausibly justify that legal remedy. And once again, 
these functions of criminal law merely describe what the criminal 
justice system does. It is an entirely separate question whether any 
of these functions are justifiable, or if they are, why they are. 
 
A. Main functions of criminal law: 
 
1. The state inflicts stigma on defendant. 
 
2. The state inflicts suffering on defendant. 
 
3. Deterrence of future crimes (by the threat of 
criminal sanctions). 
 
4. The state incapacitates the defendant 
(sometimes). 
 
5. Reinforcement of social norms.24  
 
B. Normative Principles Underlying Criminal Law 
 
The normative principles that justify criminal law (again, a 
suggestive but nonexhaustive list) are as follows. They are parallel 
to the list of principles justifying tort law, in embracing both 
nonconsequentialist and consequentialist values. 
 
1. Retributive justice 
 
One common formulation is this: the state should punish 
defendant according to what he justly deserves. 
 
2. Expressive or communicative justice 
                                                                                                             
24 Arguably, even the failure to punish also reinforces (different) social 
norms. 
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Here, the focus expands to whether the state should 
communicate, through public condemnation, that defendant has 
committed a serious wrong. 
 
3. Deterrence, in order to promote efficiency 
 
4. Deterrence, in order to prevent serious 




What follows from this typology of doctrines and principles? 
Does this articulation of the standard features of criminal law and 
tort law suggest that we should be reluctant to tinker with our 
traditional approaches? Do these standard features have a 
compelling logic behind them?  
Some would answer yes to both questions. Ernest Weinrib 
treats tort law as a self-contained, coherent system, one that should 
not be altered, even if on balance no-fault or criminal law would be 
better for society.25 In a similar spirit, some think punitive damages 
are an alien encroachment on tort law. 
I do not think we need to be so conservative and cautious. On 
the other hand, we should also resist the temptation to mix and 
match doctrines and functions at will. We do need to think 
seriously about what doctrines and features of tort law (or of 
criminal law) are essential to its underlying purposes. But we also 
must provide plausible arguments for what these underlying 
purposes are or should be. We should not merely assume the 
optimality or desirability of the contemporary state of the law. 
Law and economics advocates have it a bit easier here: many 
of them have a relatively simple view of the purposes of all legal 
sanctions. If efficiency or maximization of social welfare is the 
uniform objective of all branches of law, then we should be free to 
                                                                                                             
25 See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 45-46 (1995). For a 
critique, see Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 698 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 
(1995)). 
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tinker with or simply abandon legal doctrines to achieve that 
objective. Perhaps criminal law should be employed whenever tort 
law would be an ineffective deterrent (for example, when the 
defendant is poor and thus difficult to deter otherwise)—even 
though this prescription could result in serious criminal law 
sanctions for relatively minor forms of antisocial behavior. Perhaps 
punitive damages in tort law should be assessed only to 
compensate for otherwise inadequate incentives in cases where the 
tortious activity is especially difficult to detect26—even though this 
formulation is out of sync both with current doctrine and with 
popular intuitions about when punitive damages are properly 
awarded.27 We could make criminal law much more like tort law; 
or tort law much more like criminal law. On the economic view, 
everything is contingent. All is up for grabs. 
But if corrective and retributive justice are compelling 
rationales for the distinctive doctrines and remedial structures of 
tort law and criminal law, respectively, then the doctrines and 
structures of these different areas of law have a less contingent 
explanation. And then the crime/tort distinction has a basis in 
principle—or more precisely, a principle more nuanced than 
maximizing social welfare—and is not just a product of 
institutional constraints, administrative costs, and historical 
accident. 
Consider two important issues at the borderline of criminal 
law and torts: punitive damages and “moral luck.” Punitive 
damages might reflect a retributive rationale, akin to the just 
deserts principle asserted as a general justification for criminal law 
punishment. This is a nonconsequentialist rationale. Is it properly 
invoked in tort as well as criminal law? Even if we believe that 
corrective justice principles best justify the basic doctrines and 
structure of tort law? Perhaps these principles can, indeed, be 
accommodated in a justifiable manner—for example, by adopting 
a split recovery scheme under which victims do not receive the 
                                                                                                             
26 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 891. 
27 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do 
People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) (analyzing 
two studies to determine people's beliefs in optimal deterrence and concluding 
that a majority of people reject current administrative and judicial policies with 
respect to deterrence). 
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entirety of the punitive damage award. At the very least, we should 
not rule out the possibility of such an accommodation. 
Now consider the issue of “moral luck”—that is, the claim that 
the fortuitous occurrence of harm has a legitimate bearing on legal 
liability. In tort law, a driver who rounds a blind curve at an 
excessive speed will pay substantial damages if his dangerous 
driving results in a collision with an oncoming car and no damages 
if no car is present. In criminal law, the driver might be subject to 
liability in both cases, but will ordinarily face a much smaller 
sanction if no harm occurs. Advocates of this differential in 
punishment include some retributivists who claim that moral luck 
is relevant to retributive blame. But those who make this claim are 
sometimes accused of confusing criminal law with tort law in so 
recognizing moral luck. Whether and when the fortuity of harm 
should matter to legal liability is a notoriously difficult problem. 
The answer might depend on whether we can properly view 
criminal law, as well as tort law, as addressing the need to repair a 
relationship of the defendant to an actual victim.28 This perspective 
might or might not be defensible, but it does not merely reflect a 
conceptual conflation of criminal law and tort law functions or 
principles. 
The nascent field of crimtorts speaks to such issues at the 
borderline of the doctrinal categories. It is a field of considerable 
promise if it avoids these twin dangers: the dangers of an 
oversimplified instrumentalism and of an excessive demand for 
doctrinal purity and insulation. 
                                                                                                             
28 For some recent discussions of moral luck in tort law, see generally 
Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 
LEGAL THEORY 181, 181 (2006); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6; Gregory 
C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS & 
SOC. PHIL. 1 (2006). For discussions of moral luck in criminal law, see Michael 
Moore, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 5 
(1997). For an overview of the philosophical debate, see Dana K. Nelkin, Moral 
Luck, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2004), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck/. For 
an argument that criminal liability should depend on the defendant being 
morally responsible, or answerable, in a relational sense, to his fellow citizens, 
see generally R A DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND 
LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007). 
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